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June 29, 2005

John R. Nolon and Jessica A. Bacher
[John Nolon is a Professor at Pace University School of Law, Counsel to its Land
Use Law Center, and Visiting Professor at Yale’s School of Forestry and
Environmental Studies. Jessica Bacher is an Adjunct Professor at Pace
University School of Law and a Staff Attorney for the Land Use Law Center.]
Abstract: The United States Supreme Court’s decision in Kelo v. City of New
London, has spurred national debate, as many people portray the court’s
decision as a damaging blow to private property rights. In Kelo, the court
confirmed local government’s ability to condemn property in an area designated
as blighted by the state, in order to encourage economic development. This
article highlights several positive examples of this sort of condemnation in New
York case law, where the public interest was served by economic
redevelopment. The article goes further, to distinguish several legal decisions
from Kelo, where courts invalidated condemnations upon a finding that the
condemnations would serve private interests rather than public interests.
***
In Kelo v. City of New London, the U.S. Supreme Court affirmed the longstanding principle that governments can condemn private land in order to carry
out area-wide redevelopment projects. No. 04-108, 2005 U.S. LEXIS 5011 (June
23, 2005). The decision, which affirms the legal status quo, has been spun as a
grievous invasion of property rights that now threatens every American home.
Kelo would warrant the public attention it is getting if it had gone the other way, if
one more justice had sided with the dissent. The Kelo facts involve the taking of
private land in a designated redevelopment area in a state designated distressed
city. It is the prior law and the Court’s holding in this limited context that is the
subject of this column.
In most states, including New York, had the Court gone the other way, the
decision would have muddied clear and long-settled state court precedents; used
federal courts to dictate state-defined property rights and public interests; cast a
shadow over a procedure that has led to the revival of distressed downtowns,
urban neighborhoods, and waterfronts throughout the country; limited one of the
few fiscal remedies available to economically distressed cities; and strapped their
ability to redevelop dangerous brownfields located in poor neighborhoods – a
matter of environmental justice.
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The Legal Question
In Kelo, the question was whether the taking by condemnation of title to
unblighted single-family homes for the purpose of transferring ownership to a
private developer to accomplish a large-scale waterfront redevelopment project
constituted a public use under the Fifth Amendment. The terms of the
Amendment allow such takings, but only if they accomplish a public use and
require the payment of just compensation to the condemnees. At issue is the
critical matter of whether distressed cities, like New London, when specifically
authorized by state legislation, can carry out programs to increase jobs,
strengthen their tax bases, revitalize neighborhoods, and stabilize property
values by condemning the land of private property owners who are not willing to
sell to the government at a negotiated price.
Public sympathies for Ms. Kelo and her fellow petitioners run high. Their homes
are not blighted, two or three of them have lived in the neighborhood for
decades, and their futures are clouded by having to use the compensation they
will receive to relocate and build new lives among new neighbors. On the other
side is the stark reality of life in New London and other cities throughout the
country that are struggling to revitalize themselves so that they can provide
public services and a decent quality of life for the disproportionately high
percentage of homeless, jobless, and income-strapped citizens they shelter.
New York Law
In an amici curiae brief filed in Kelo, the Empire State Development Corporation
noted its success in transforming neighborhoods surrounding the New York
Stock Exchange, Seven World Trade Center, and in the 42nd Street
Redevelopment Area, using authority to condemn private properties and convey
them to private development companies under the strict procedures established
in statutes adopted by the New York State legislature. Its brief notes that “despite
private benefits, the predominant economic and social benefits have accrued to
the public.”
In Rosenthal & Rosenthal Inc. v. The New York State Urban Development
Corporation, 771 F.2d 44 (2d Cir. 1985), the Second Circuit affirmed a District
Court decision upholding the taking of the petitioners’ unblighted buildings which
were needed for the 42nd Street Redevelopment Project. The District Court
found that the proposed taking was rationally related to a conceivable public
purpose. The Second Circuit noted that “the power of eminent domain is a
fundamental and necessary attribute of sovereignty, superior to all private
property rights.” It rested its decision on the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision the
previous year in Hawaii Housing Authority v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229 (1984),
concluding that “courts long have recognized that the compensated taking of
private property for urban renewal or community redevelopment is not proscribed
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by the Constitution.” The Supreme Court denied certiorari in Rosenthal in 1986.
475 U.S. 1018 (1986).
We heard from the Court of Appeals on the subject in 1986 in a unanimous
opinion written by Judge Kaye in a case that also challenged the Urban
Development Corporation’s (UDC) condemnations in the 42nd Street
Redevelopment Project area. Jackson v. New York State Urban Development
Corporation, 494 N.E.2d 429 (N.Y. 1986). The court noted that, as required by
the state Eminent Domain Procedure Law (EDPL), the UDC had made a
reasoned determination that the condemnation would serve a valid public
purpose and that the scope of the court’s review under the statute is narrow. The
EDPL is representative of statutes in a number of states that guide and limit the
power of government to exercise the power of eminent domain. Under this
statute the condemning authority must provide public notice, hold a public
hearing, specify the public use, benefit, and purpose of the project. The court
cited the U.S. Supreme Court’s opinion in Hawaii Housing Authority for the
proposition that the due process requirements of the Constitution are satisfied
where there is a rational relationship to a conceivable public purpose.
Various industrial companies, including several oil refineries, challenged the City
of Syracuse Industrial Development Agency for condemning their properties to
further a waterfront redevelopment master plan for an 800 acre area on the south
shore of Onondaga Lake known as “oil city.” Sun Company, Inc. v. City of
Syracuse IDA, 625 N.Y.S.2d 371 (N.Y. App. Div. 1995). The area was located
next to several low-income neighborhoods in Syracuse where a
disproportionately large percentage of welfare recipients, jobless, and poverty
level households resided. This is a classic environmental justice context. The
court followed the tests outlined in Jackson and found that the purpose of the
taking was to accomplish a proper use and that this determination was not
without a proper foundation. The petitioners’ motion for leave to appeal was
denied by the Court of Appeals in 1997. 679 N.E.2d 643 (N.Y. 1997).
The Kelo Decision
The majority in the Kelo case, a 5-4 decision written by Justice Stevens, held that
the purpose for the taking was a legitimate public use, clearing the way for the
New London Development Corporation to condemn title from nine individual
owners who held onto 15 parcels of the 115 private lots in the redevelopment
area. Justice Stevens noted: “For more than a century, our public use
jurisprudence has wisely eschewed rigid formulas and intrusive scrutiny in favor
of affording legislatures broad latitude in determining what public needs justify
the use of the takings power.”
The dissenting opinion, drafted by Justice O’Connor, agreed with the petitioners
who argued that the Court should establish a new “heightened scrutiny” test for
takings designed to accomplish economic development purposes. Such takings
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could be classified as invalid per se, presumptively invalid, or invalid if the
condemning authority could not prove with reasonable certainty that significant
public benefits will be accomplished. Interestingly, O’Connor’s impassioned
dissent argues against the approach she adopted a few weeks earlier in the
landmark decision Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., No. 04-163, 2005 U.S. LEXIS
4342 (May 23, 2005). That decision, which she authored, changed the rules for
determining whether governmental regulations constitute a taking of property
without compensation under the Fifth Amendment. Lingle repealed a 25 year-old
standard that invalidated a government regulation as a taking if it fails to
substantially advance a legitimate public purpose. In Lingle, Justice O’Connor
eliminated the test because it requires “courts to scrutinize the efficacy of a vast
array of state and federal regulations -- a task for which courts are not well
suited. Moreover, it would empower -- and often require -- the courts to
substitute their predictive judgments for those of elected legislatures and expert
agencies.” This aligns squarely with the rationale of Midkiff in which the Court
noted that “empirical debates over the wisdom of takings – no less than debates
over the wisdom of other kinds of socioeconomic legislation – are not to be
carried out in the federal courts.”
Under existing case law, the Court defers to public use determinations of
condemning authorities, regardless of the context. If New London had decided
that Ms. Kelo’s parcel were needed for a public road or to be conveyed to a utility
company for telephone, transportation, or gas line conveyance, both the majority
and dissenting justices would defer to the determination that the purpose for
which the land was taken was a public one, within the meaning of the Fifth
Amendment. The dissenters, however, believe that when the purpose is to
further the economic objectives of the community, a stricter test should be used.
The cases cited by the majority involved the validation of takings of private
property in order to advance economic development, such as accomplishing the
revival of a blighted urban neighborhood in Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26
(1954), and eliminating the social and economic evils of a land oligopoly by
requiring land transfers from lessors to lessess in Hawaii Housing Authority.
In these cases, compensation was paid and the court deferred to the
government’s public use determination. The majority noted that in Berman, taking
a nonblighted department store to effect area wide redevelopment of a blighted
area was within the scope of the police power. The Berman Court noted that “the
concept of the public welfare is broad and inclusive. … The values it represents
are spiritual as well as physical, aesthetic as well as monetary. It is within the
power of the legislature to determine that the community should be beautiful as
well as healthy, spacious as well as clean, well-balanced as well as carefully
patrolled.”
The minority, apparently content with deference in these prior economic
development cases, distinguished them from Kelo in that the condemned
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property in Berman and Midkiff “inflicted affirmative harm on society” and the
taking, therefore, was necessary to “eliminate the existing property use to
remedy the harm.” Dismissing the broad description of the police power in
Berman as “errant language,” the dissent approached Kelo as if it were a case of
first impression. It would limit deference to cases where the condemned property
had “veered to such an extreme that the public was suffering as a consequence,”
thinking, apparently, that the unblighted parcels of Kelo and her fellow petitioners
were not harmful to the area redevelopment plan in the same way that the
petitioner’s unblighted department store in the District of Columbia was harmful
to the area redevelopment plan in Berman. In both cases, however, the
acquisition of all parcels in the redevelopment area was essential to the projects’
success.
The city council in New London, a legislative body, determined – in effect – that
the petitioners’ properties, in fact, were “harmful” to the interest of its citizens.
Recall that it was operating under authority of a state statute aimed at promoting
economic redevelopment in distressed cities and that New London was
designated a distressed city by the state. The city council and the state
legislature understood the context of the system of public finance where the real
property tax is the balancing factor in the creation of the municipal budget. The
median household income of New London’s residents is 40% less than the state
median; its poverty rate is twice that of the state’s; and its unemployment rate
30% higher than the rest of the state.
When the city’s redevelopment plan for its waterfront was initiated – with its
promise of hundreds of new jobs and greatly enhanced property taxes – the city’s
population had been shrinking and it had just lost a major employer. Under our
system of government, its options were limited; the constraints on its ability to
increase municipal revenue seriously affected its ability, like that of most
distressed cities, to meet the pressing needs of its poor and moderate income
neighborhoods and households. The City needed all the parcels in the area to
carry out an area-wide plan. Not securing them, therefore, would be harmful to
the city and its residents.
The Parade of Horribles
The petitioners were represented by an advocacy litigation group that raised
public awareness of the fact that some public takings are abusive. The specter
of corrupt, or misguided, local officials condemning title to property of private
property owners primarily to benefit private developers was on the mind of the
minority. In response, the majority made it clear that “[s]uch a one-to-one
transfer of property, executed outside the confines of an integrated development
plan, is not presented in this case.” Kennedy, in a concurring opinion, reminded
the minority that under the rational basis test, giving due deference to the public
use determination, the Court can invalidate a condemnation by finding, in a
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particular case, that the public benefits achieved by such a suspicious transfer
are only incidental to the benefits that will be conferred on the private parties.
The dissent disparages Kennedy’s confidence in the rational-basis test as
sufficient to ferret out privately motivated takings, by applying the “stupid staffer”
test: suggesting that only the most inept administrations could fail to paper over a
private deal and make it appear public in nature. The dissent is apparently
unaware of numerous cases called to the Court’s attention in amici briefs
submitted in Kelo. In 99 Cents Only Store v. Lancaster Redevelopment Agency,
for example, a federal district court in California invalidated the condemnation of
a store to accommodate the interest of an adjacent Costco’s expansion plans; it
found that the redevelopment agency’s only purpose “was to satisfy the private
expansion demands of Costco.” 237 F. Supp. 2d 1123 (C.D. Cal 2001). In
Bailey v. Meyers, 76 P.3d 898 (Ariz. 2003), the state court held that the taking of
a brake shop for a hardware store to advance economic development lacked the
requisite public purpose. Donald Trump’s attempt to get the Casino
Reinvestment Development Authority in New Jersey to condemn the parcels of a
few landowners who had refused to sell to expand his hotel and casino was
thwarted by the state court; it found that the Authority had given Trump a blank
check regarding future development on the site.
Casino Reinvestment
Development Authority v. Banin, 727 A.2d 102 (N.J. Sup. Ct.1998).
Under state law, in fact, courts have invalidated condemnations in Arizona,
California, Georgia, Illinois, Indiana, Michigan, Missouri, New Jersey, and
Virginia. In all these cases, there was no sustaining public presence of the type
involved in all redevelopment projects. In cases involving no more than a one-toone transfer of title between businesses, as a de facto matter, the court’s
suspicion is aroused and, under the rational-basis test, it senses a lack of public
involvement and purpose. This enables state courts to invalidate such
condemnations, saving the homes of average Americans and the businesses of
moms and pops, dulling the edge of the hard cutting rhetoric of those alarmed by
the majority’s decision in Kelo.
Kennedy’s caveat regarding how the rational basis test can be used to invalidate
one-to-one transfers is a strong cautionary message to condemning authorities.
Reading the 5-4 decision as a reminder to act reasonably, legislatures should, as
most do, justify the use of condemnation as a necessary means of achieving
clearly stated public goals in redevelopment projects. Where there is little public
presence in the development and imprecise means of securing the intended
public benefits, there is less evident rationality and more vulnerability to
invalidation.
There is a further response to the alarmists. Redevelopment projects don’t
gestate in back rooms with greedy politicians waiting as midwives to the birth of
private wealth. They are subject to onerous, transparent, and lengthy processes
that provide all the details of the project and invite public participation and
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extensive debate. In New London, the public was asked what it thought about
the redevelopment project as the project was debated, shaped, and decided over
twenty months – nearly two years. In New York, under the State Environmental
Quality Review Act, redevelopment projects generate foot-high environmental
impact statements that include a hard look at their impact on community
character and neighborhood change and contain lengthy chapters on all the
economic and environmental consequences of the project.
Public hearings, ULURP proceedings in New York City, reviews of impact
statements, open meeting laws, conflict of interest rules, and a host of other legal
protections ensure that the public knows who is involved, how they were chosen,
what the proposed benefits are, and who will suffer. When such projects are
approved, this public process has mediated the claims of those affected such as
Ms. Kelo and her neighbors and the evidence that the greater public will be
benefited by jobs, public revenues, and property improvement.
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